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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 07-1332
____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
WILLIAM D. STEVENSON,
Appellant

____________
On Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
D.C. No. 05-cv-00327
District Judge: Honorable Terrence F. McVerry
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 23, 2008
Before: SMITH, HARDIMAN and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 3, 2008)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

William Stevenson appeals his sentence despite having waived his right to appeal.
We will affirm.
I.
Because we write for the parties, we recount only those facts essential to our
decision.
Stevenson pleaded guilty to distribution of material depicting the sexual
exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) and accepted responsibility
for possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). In a written plea
agreement, Stevenson waived his right to appeal unless: (1) the government filed an
appeal; (2) the sentence exceeded the statutory maximum; or (3) the court unreasonably
departed upward from the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) range. In
this appeal, Stevenson claims that the District Court exceeded the statutory maximum
when it imposed the following conditions of supervised release:
Defendant shall submit your person, residence, place of business, computer,
and/or vehicle to a warrantless search conducted and controlled by the
probation office at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner, based
upon reasonable suspicion of contraband or evidence of a violation of a
condition of release. The failure to submit to a search may be grounds for
revocation. Defendant shall inform any other residents that the premises
and computer(s) may be subject to a search pursuant to this condition.
(emphasis added).
Because Stevenson does not challenge the voluntariness of his appellate waiver,
we will enforce it unless it “work[s] a miscarriage of justice.” See United States v.
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Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 558 (3d Cir. 2001). The gravamen of Stevenson’s appeal is that
the District Court exceeded the statutory maximum because the United States Code does
not specifically authorize the search of a supervised releasee’s place of business. See 18
U.S.C. § 3563(b)(23). This argument is based on the fallacy that the conditions
enumerated in § 3563(b)(23) are exhaustive. As 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) makes clear, the
court may impose “any other condition it considers to be appropriate.” Likewise, 18
U.S.C. § 3563(b)(22) notes that the sentencing court may require the defendant to “satisfy
such other conditions as [it] may impose,” provided that those other conditions are
reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors.
Because we find that 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(22) and 3583(d) gave the District
Court discretion to impose on Stevenson conditions of supervised release beyond those
catalogued in § 3563(b)(23), we hold that the condition Stevenson challenges did not
exceed the statutory maximum authorized by the United States Code. Therefore, this
appeal does not elude Stevenson’s appellate waiver.
We now consider whether enforcement of the appellate waiver would work a
manifest injustice. See United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 205-06 (3d Cir. 2007).
We can find manifest injustice only in “unusual circumstance[s] where an error
amounting to a miscarriage of justice may invalidate the waiver.” Khattak, 273 F.3d at
562. In reviewing a sentencing error for a manifest injustice, we may consider “the
clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a
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sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant,
the impact of correcting the error on the government, and the extent to which the
defendant acquiesced in the result.” Id. at 563 (citation omitted).
Our review of the record finds no manifest injustice here. Stevenson claims that
the District Court abused its discretion in imposing this condition because a prospective
employer is so unlikely to hire him that it amounts to “a greater deprivation of liberty than
is reasonably necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).” (internal quotation marks
omitted). In light of the catch-all provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563(b)(22) and 3583(d)
and Stevenson’s history of accessing images involving child pornography at his
workplace, we cannot conclude that this sentencing condition was an abuse of discretion,
let alone a “blatant error.” See Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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